We propose a new paradigm for robust geometric computations that complements the classical fixed precision paradigm (interval geometry, -geometry and stable algorithms) and the exact geometric computation paradigm. We provide a framework where we study algorithmic problems under smoothed analysis of the input, the relaxation of the problem requirements, or the witness of a recognition problem. Our framework specifies a widely applicable set of prerequisites that make real RAM algorithms suitable for smoothed analysis. We prove that suitable algorithms can (under smoothed analysis) be robustly executed with expected logarithmic bit-precision. This shows in a formal way that inputs which need high bit-precision are contrived and that these algorithms are likely robust for realistic input. Interestingly our techniques generalize to problems with a natural notion of resource augmentation (geometric packing, the art gallery problem) and recognition problems (recognition of realizable order types or disk intersection graphs).
Introduction
The RAM is a mathematical model of a computer which emulates how a computer can access and manipulate data. Within computational geometry, algorithms are often analyzed within the real RAM [48, 75, 99] (or the later Blum-Shub-Smale machine [17] ) where values with infinite precision can be stored and compared in constant space and time. By allowing these infinite precision computations, it becomes possible to verify geometric primitives in constant time, which simplifies the analysis of geometric algorithms. Mairson and Stolfi [79] point out that "without this assumption it is virtually impossible to prove the correctness of any geometric algorithms." The downside of the real RAM is that it neglects the bit-precision of the underlying algorithms, although they are very important in practice. If an algorithm can be correctly executed with a limited bit-precision then the algorithm is called robust. Many classical examples in computational geometry are inherently nonrobust [99] and there are even examples which in the worst case require a bit-precision exponential in n in order to be correctly executed [53, 65] .
Often inputs which require exponential bit-precision are contrived and do not resemble realistic inputs. A natural way to capture this from a theoretical perspective is smoothed analysis, which interpolates smoothly between worst case analysis and average case analysis [110] . Practical inputs are constructed inherently with small amount of noise and random perturbation. This perturbation helps to show performance guarantees in terms of the input size and and the magnitude of the perturbation. By now smoothed analysis is well-established, for instance Spielman and Teng received the Gödel Prize for it. However, within computational geometry its application is limited to smoothed analysis of the bit-precision of the art gallery problem [38] and order type realisability [63] , and smoothed analysis of the runtime of k-means clustering [5, 80] , Euclidean TSP [41, 81] , and partitioning algorithms for Euclidean functionals [15] .
In this paper, we apply smoothed analysis to the real RAM to show that many geometric algorithms can be correctly executed in practice with logarithmic bit-precision. This analysis has implications on several levels: (1) Many classical nonrobust geometric algorithms (computing Delaunay triangulations, convex hulls or order types) can in practice be executed using finite precision.
(2) Many classical optimization problems which have a natural problem relaxation (the art gallery problem, geometric packing, computing the minimum-link path) can in practice be executed using finite precision. (3) Solutions to many classical ∃ -complete problems (such as disk intersection-graph recognition or the Steinitz problem in fixed dimension) have polynomial size. (4) The classical sum of square roots problem can be correctly solved with a bit-precision which is linear in the number of square roots that are summed. Point (4) provides theoretical verification of an old observation that in practice this problem only requires linear Ch. 45] .
Indeed, there are examples which require an exponential number of bits in any numerical representation. This exponential bit-precision phenomenon occurs not only for segment intersection graphs, but also for many other natural algorithmic problems [1-3, 14, 26, 27, 37, 39, 42, 51, 66, 71, 78, 83, 85, 94, 100-102, 107-109] . It turns out that all of those algorithmic problems do not accidentally require exponential bit-precision, but are closely linked, as they are all complete for a certain complexity class called ∃ . Thus either all of those problems belong to NP, or none of them do. Using our results on smoothed analysis, we show that for many ∃ -hard problems the exponential bit-precision phenomenon only occurs for near-degenerate input.
The complexity class ∃ can be defined as the set of decision problems that are polynomialtime equivalent to deciding if a formula of the Existential Theory of the Reals (ETR) is true or not. An ETR formula has the form: Ψ = ∃x 1 , . . . , x n Φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ),
where Φ is a well-formed sentence over the alphabet Σ = {0, 1, x 1 , . . . , +, ·, =, ≤, <, ∧, ∨, ¬}.
More specifically, Φ is quantifier-free and x 1 , . . . , x n are all variables of Φ. We say Ψ is true if and only if there are real numbers x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ such that Φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is true.
Formally modeling algorithms and robustness. We define in Appendix A.1 a framework for real RAM algorithms to which we can apply smoothed analysis. A real RAM algorithm A receives a combination of real and integer input I = (a, b) ∈ n × m and performs a series of instructions. Importantly, integer and real valued computations are never mixed. The order of the program flow is only determined by the comparison instructions. We say two inputs I and I are equivalent under A if A makes the same decision at every comparison instruction. Note that for equivalent inputs, an algorithm A always outputs the same combinatorial solution. We say A is robust if for every input I = (a, b) ∈ n × m , there is an equivalent input I = (a , b), such that a has bounded bit-precision. Let us consider the real RAM without the square root or trigonometric Figure . Given real input (a 1 , a 2 ), we want to decide if the point (in orange) p = (a 1 , a 2 ) lies above or below the line ( y = x/2 + 1). If the point p lies very close to , we need a very high precision to make a correct decision. However, if p was perturbed slightly, low precision is sufficient to make a correct decision correctly with high probability and in expectation. Note that rounding the coordinates of p to w bits corresponds to snapping p to a grid width ω = 2 −w .
operations. At all times during the computation, a real register holds a value which can be described as the quotient of two polynomials p q of the real input values a.
Note that adding, subtracting, or multiplying two rational functions yields another rational function, possibly of higher degree; for example,
We say an algorithm A has algebraic-degree ∆, if p and q always have total degree at most ∆. Similarly, A has algebraicdimension d, if the number of variables in p and q are always at most d.
We assume that our real-valued input can be represented as a higher-dimensional point a ∈ [0, 1] n . This normalization assumption makes it easier to phrase our results, as the meaning of the magnitude of perturbation is with respect to the size of the involved numbers. Given a, the corresponding integer-valued input a limited precision as follows: is the closest point to a in the scaled integer lattice Γ ω = ω d . (We refer to this transformation as snapping.) We upper bound the minimal number of bits required for a correct execution of A by proving lower bounds for the scale factor ω.
Results and paper structure. In the following sections we present a framework to apply smoothed analysis to a wide class of real RAM algorithms. The real RAM and the abstract notion of an algorithm are often-debated, multifaceted concepts. The discussion of their intricacies and subtleties are technical and involved, and therefore ill-suited for the main body of this paper. We wish to highlight the generality of our framework and the wide practical and theoretical implications that it has. At the same time, we incline to not over-state our results. Therefore we defer the formal definition of the real RAM and the proofs of the theorems that rely on this definition to the appendix and instead use the main body of the paper to carefully state and explain the results. We believe one of the strengths of our results is that given the real RAM definitions, our proofs are not overly involved, which makes the framework extendable if needed.
The following sections discuss our results, their implications, and their limitations. Section 2 shows that for realistic input, classical geometrical algorithms are robust. Section 4 shows that resource augmentation of hard problems is a feasible model for their practical performance. Section 5 shows that a typical witness to a recognition problem can be described using logarithmic bit-precision. Section 6 shows that real verification algorithms are robust under perturbations of the witness and Section 7 shows that having a real verification algorithm is equivalent to ∃ -membership.
Results of Smoothed Analysis of real RAM Algorithms
After precisely definining of both real RAM algorithms and smoothed analysis in Appendix A, we study real RAM algorithms of bounded algebraic-degree and algebraic-dimension under smoothed analysis of their input. Specifically, in Appendix B, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem . Consider the real RAM without square roots and a polynomial time algorithm A with algebraic-degree ∆ and constant algebraic-dimension. Then under perturbations of the input of magnitude δ, A can be robustly executed with an expected input bit-precision of O log ∆n δ and an expected intermediary precision of O ∆ 2 log ∆n δ .
It is important to point out that in the proof of this theorem, we bound only the bit-precision of the real-valued input, and not the bit-precision of any intermediate results. However, it is easy to see that if we have d integers a 1 , . . . , a d represented using k bits each, then any d-variate polynomial of degree at most ∆ can be evaluated using at most O(∆ 2 k log d) bits of precision. The proof idea ( Figure 5 ) is to consider the algorithm A with perturbed input I x = (a + x, b). Where a and b are arbitrary input and x is a small perturbation. We model the perturbed input I x as a high-dimensional point which we snap to a fine grid to obtain I (input which can be described using bounded precision). We then show that, for any algorithm A that meets our prerequisites, I and I x are equivalent with high probability. We upper bound the probability that I and I x are not equivalent as follows: the input I x is snapped to the center point of a fine grid and the center points of the grid define a Voronoi diagram. The content of a real RAM register for a specific comparison instruction, is per assumption the quotient of two polynomials whose variables depend on the input. The core argument is, that if I x lies in a Voronoi cell which is not intersected by the variety of either of the two polynomials, then the comparison instruction will be computed correctly. We upper bound the proportion of Voronoi cells that are intersected by the variety of a polynomial with Theorem 20 in Appendix D.
Implications of Theorem 1. Theorem 1 has implications for many classically nonrobust real RAM algorithms that rely only on geometric primitives that have constant algebraic-degree and algebraic-dimension. We point out some of them in the following corollary.
Corollary (of Theorem ). The following problems can under perturbations of the input of magnitude δ be robustly solved with expected bit-precision O(log(n/δ)) for input and computations:
Sorting real numbers. Computing the convex hull of a point set in fixed dimension. Computing Delaunay-triangulation in fixed dimension.
Checking if a set of guards surveys an entire polygon. Let us discuss the computation of the Delaunay triangulation and the convex hull in more detail. Computing the convex hull in constant dimension is nonrobust [67] since the orientation test cannot be computed in a robust manner. Since convex hulls are one of the classical geometric structures, their robustness has been extensively studied under various conditions and in various dimensions [4, 20, 60, 76, 87, 99] . We note that orientation testing in constant dimension has constant algebraic-degree and algebraic-dimension. Thus, Theorem 1 implies that the convex hulls of realistic input sets can be robustly computed with only logarithmic bit-precision.
The nonrobustness of the in-circle test implies nonrobustness of computing Delaunay triangulations. Many geometric algorithms rely on Delaunay triangulations and therefore its robustness has been extensively studied. Studied topics include exact computing of triangulations [86, 91], Delaunay-like structures with more forgiving primitives [7, 8, 77] , and Delaunay triangulations of imprecise as opposed to real input [21, 62, 68, 113] . The incircle test considers at most two points
Figure .
In a polygonal domain with holes, we want to compare the length of two given paths. and a circle, and therefore has constant algebraic-degree and algebraic-dimension in constant dimension. It follows that Delaunay triangulations of realistic constant-dimensional point sets can be robustly computed with only logarithmic bit-precision.
Limitations. We want to briefly give examples of algorithmic problems that do not fit the framework that Theorem 1 provides. Algorithmic problems that have non-constant algebraicdimension do not satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1. There are geometric questions, such as computing the average width of a point set, that are defined on input of arbitrary size; Theorem 1 cannot be applied to algorithms that use these kind of primitives. Geometric primitives that have algebraic-degree exponential in n do fit in this framework; however, the outcome of the Theorem may not be desirable. Recursive real RAM algorithms may potentially have very high algebraic-degree. Also our methods are not useful for problems that explicitly try to construct degenerate (measure zero) output. As an example consider the 3SUM problem. Under our perturbation model, with probability one, a perturbed input to 3SUM contains no three elements that sum to zero. Similarly, randomly perturbed points in the plane almost never contain three collinear points. Thus the notion of random perturbation may not be sensible for problems that explicitly deal with degeneracies. Lastly Theorem 1 is not applicable to algorithms that use square roots (unless they can be easily eliminated). The required bit-precision for the sum of square roots is an open problem within computational geometry [89, 90] . Therefore we extend our framework to specifically include square roots.
Results of Smoothed Analysis of real RAM Algorithms with Square Roots
In Appendix B we work under the assumption that at all times, every real register R[i] contains a value that can be expressed as the quotient of two d-variate polynomials f i , g i of maximal degree ∆. We strengthen our analysis in Appendix C by allowing the square root operation. This means that real registers are even allowed to contain contrived expressions f such as
. We transform each such expression f into an equivalent set of polynomials {p, q 1 , . . . , q s }. Intuitively the introduction of each square root introduces one extra algebraic-dimension. The algebraicdegree and the algebraic-dimension of f are inherited from p, q 1 , . . . , q s .
Theorem . Consider the real RAM with square roots and a polynomial time algorithm A with algebraic-degree ∆, algebraic-dimension d, and extra algebraic-dimension s. Then under perturbations of the input of magnitude δ, A can be correctly executed on a real RAM if the input has an expected required bit-precision of O
Implications of Theorem 3. The theorem conditions are parametrized by the abstract extra algebraic-dimension. This makes the theorem apply to a wide class of algorithmic problems that Erickson, van der Hoog, Miltzow XX:
in some way or another need to evaluate square root functions, but perhaps makes it harder to see its applications. Therefore we wish to highlight two applications of the theorem. The first is on the classical sum of square roots algorithm, which takes as input the real-valued numbers a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n and decides if i=1,...,n a i − i=1,...,n b i > 0, by computing the sums with limited bit-precision. Yap and Sharma observe that the best known theoretical bounds for the required bit-precision of the input is exponential in n [112, Ch. 45]. However, they note that in practice it has been observed that a near-linear bit-precision seems sufficient. The following corollary gives a theoretical explanation for this practical observation:
Corollary . Under perturbations of the input of magnitude δ, the sum of square roots can be computed on a real RAM with an expected bit-precision of O(n log(n/δ)) per input variable.
A second implication is the computation of the shortest path in a simple polygon with holes. The bottleneck here is to compare the length of two given paths, see Figure 6 .
Corollary . Under perturbations of the input of magnitude δ, the shortest path in a polygon can be computed on a real RAM with an expected bit-precision of O(n log(n/δ)) per path vertex variable.
Limitations. There are two limitations of these results that we wish to mention. First of all, this theorem gives an upper bound on the expected bit-precision of the input variables. The difference is, that in Theorem 1 we could also prove that the precision needed for intermediate computations is bounded. In particular when one starts to recursively apply the square root operation, the required intermediate precision can explode. Second, the linear bit-precision needed for the sum of square roots and shortest path problems might be considered unpractical.
Results of Smoothed Analysis of Resource Augmentation
The predominant approach to find decent solutions for hard optimization problems is to compute an approximation. An alternative approach is resource augmentation, where you consider an optimal solution subject to a slightly weaker problem constraints. This alternative approach has considerably less traction in theoretical computer science than approximation algorithms have. We want to emphasize that resource augmentation algorithms find a solution which does not compromise the optimality. Using smoothed analysis, we argue that studying slight relaxations of algorithmic problems is justifyable for practical applications of the algorithm as we show that the problem conditions that make the problem hard are brittle.
An example of resource augmentation exists for the geometric packing problem ( Figure 7 ) where an algorithm needs to pack a set of convex objects into a unit-size square container. To pack the optimal number of objects into this container is ∃ -complete [3] and therefore a word RAM algorithm cannot hope to correctly find an optimal solution with limited time or memory. A resource augmentation algorithm looks to find a way to pack as many objects into a container C which is larger by a factor (1 + α) (α being the augmentation parameter). We apply smoothed analysis to resource augmentation problems, where we study these problems under a slight perturbation of the augmentation parameter. We prove in Appendix F resource augmentation problems have expected logarithmic bit-precision and give the optimal solution.
Theorem . Let P be a resource augmentation problem that is monotonous, moderate and smoothable. Under perturbations of the augmentation of magnitude δ, the problem P has an optimal solution with an expected bit-precision of O(log(n/δ)).
In the proof of this theorem (Appendix F) we argue about the solution space of the problem P and we define three natural properties of this solution space. The monotonous property demands that as we relax P more and more, the solution space only gains more candidate solutions. The moderate property demands that as we continuously relax the problem, we do not encounter more than a polynomial number of new optimums. In many hard optimization problems, the optimum is a value between 1 and n and the moderate property is then immediately implied. The smoothable property is the least intuitive of the three, it demands if you relax a problem P by , then it contains a solution which is optimal for the original problem and has a bit-precision of O (log(n/ )). It might appear as though the third property immediately implies the theorem, yet recall that we look for an optimal solution for the newly relaxed problem. The other two properties, together with common bounds in probability theory bound the expected bit-precision of an optimal solution to the perturbed problem.
Implications of Theorem 6. To illustrate the applicability of our findings, we give the following corollary. The first result was already shown in [38] . Recently Kostitsyna et al. showed that an optimal solution to the minimum-link path must have at least linear bit-precision [72] . The art gallery problem has been shown to be ∃ -complete [2], and currently ∃ -completeness of the packing problems is in preparation [3] . Our results imply that apart from near-degenerate conditions the solutions to these problems have logarithmic bit-precision.
Corollary . Under perturbations of the augmentation of magnitude δ, the following problems have an optimal solution with an expected bit-precision of O(log(n/δ)).
the art gallery problem under perturbation of edge inflation [38] . packing polygonal objects into a square container under perturbation of the container width. computing the minimum-link path in a simple polygon under perturbation of edge inflation.
Limitations.
Given an algorithmic problem, it is not clear a priori whether there is a way to augment resources such that it is both mathematically sound, satisfying, as well as practically plausible. For example, if we search for the smallest square container that fits a given set of items, the number of changes in the optimum is unbounded thus the moderate property does not hold.
Results of Smoothed Analysis of Recognition Problems
In computational geometry, we study many different geometric objects like point sets, polytopes, disks, balls, line-arrangements, segments, and rays. Many algorithms only use combinatorial properties of the underlying geometry. A recent impressive example is the EPTAS for the clique problem on disk intersection graphs by Bonamy et al. [19] . In the paper they first derive a set of properties for disk intersection graphs (including that they contain no two induced odd-cycles in their complement) and then they use only those properties to find a new EPTAS. Suppose that a geometric problem can be solved using only precomputed combinatorial properties. Then given the combinatorial structure, we do not require real RAM computations Given a disk intersection graph (combinatorial structure) G, there exists by definition a set of disks D (witness) representing G = G D . We perturb D slightly. Each perturbation x defines a new set of disks D x . And in turn each set D x defines a new graph G x . In this way, we us the perturbation on the disks to attain indirectly a probability distribution over the graphs. and the algorithm is robust. Indeed, Bonamy et al. emphasize that their algorithm also works without the disk representation. The crux for this approach, is that we first need a family of properties that describe all geometric objects of a certain type. This is the motivation for recognition problems. The formal definition of recognition problems is presented in Appendix E but a classical example is the problem of recognizing disk intersection graphs ( Figure 8 ). In this algorithmic problem the input is a graph G and we ask if there is a set of disks D, such that the disk intersection graph G D equals G. In other words, we wonder whether there exists a simple characterization of the class of graphs that can arise as disk intersection graphs. The answer is likely no as it is ∃ -complete to recognize disk intersection graphs [83] . By now, we know that the same holds for many recognition problems including the Steinitz problem, recognising visibility and unit distance graphs [23, 94, 101] . The overarching message is that we cannot forget about the geometry, when we seek for new algorithms. Our smoothed analysis shows that for typical instances at least the bit-precision of these hard recognition problems can be bounded.
In order to apply the concept of smoothed analysis, we need to define the concept of perturbation. One naive way to define perturbations for graph recognition is to alter the edges of the graph, by randomly adding or removing a δ-fraction of all the edges. There are several disadvantages to this approach. First of all, it will lead to a majority of the instances being non-representable. The reason is that if an induced subgraph H ⊂ G cannot be represented, than also the entire graph G cannot be represented. The second reason, is that this perturbation is not geometrically motivated. In our approach, we define the perturbation in terms of the underlying geometric representation of the given combinatorial input. This in turn, gives indirectly a distribution on the combinatorial structure. We illustrate this process for disk intersection graphs. Given some graph G, we consider any disk representation D. We define a notion of perturbation on D, in a natural geometric way. Thus every perturbation x, gives rise to a new set of disks D x , which in turn defines a new graph G x . In this way, we have defined indirectly a model of perturbation on the graphs. The justification for this model of perturbation is the assumption that the combinatorial structures came from some geometric objects subject to noise.
Theorem . Let A be an extraction algorithm with a recognition problem R A and denote by n 1 and n 2 the size of the input for A and R A respectively. Suppose that under perturbations of the input of A, the algorithm A can be robustly executed if the input has an expected maximal bit-precision of
O(log(n 1 /δ)). Then the recognition problem R A , under slight perturbation of the witness, can be robustly verified with an expected bit-precision of O(log(n 2 /δ)).
The proof of Theorem 8 follows almost immediately from the definition of an extraction algorithm, see Appendix E. together with Theorem 1. The real-valued input of an extraction algorithm is the witness of the recognition problem. The simplicity of its correctness contrasts its implications.
Implications of Theorem 8. The theorem applies to an array of recognition problems:
Corollary . The following recognition problems under perturbations of the witness of magnitude δ admit solutions with an expected bit-precision of O(log n/δ):
Recognition of realizable order types [63] (equivalent to Stretchability).
Recognition of disk intersection graphs. Recognition of segment intersection graphs. Recognition of ray intersection graphs. The Steinitz Problem in fixed dimension.
The practical implications of these corollaries are that apart from near degenerate examples, realizable order types and intersection graphs can be represented by geometric objects that are described with logarithmic bit-precision. The theoretical implications follow in the next section.
Limitations. We want to point out that we cannot handle all recognition problems. First of all it may be that the extraction algorithm does not meet the conditions of Theorem 1. Usually, this would be the case if the problem deals with unbounded dimension. We still get some bounds on the bit-precision but they may be less desirable. A concrete example is the recognition of ball intersection graphs, where the dimension of the ball is part of the input. Secondly perturbing a witness may not be a sensible idea. It does not mean that our theorems do not apply in a mathematical sense, but rather that in reality the result may be less desirable. Usually, this applies to problems that rely on degeneracies in one way or another. A concrete example is the point visibility graph recognition problem. Given a set of points P, we define a graph by making two points p, q ∈ P adjacent if line segment pq contains no other point of P. This in turn defines a recognition problem where we are given a visibility graph G and we look for a point set P G that realizes this visibility graph. If we perturb the real-valued witness P G then with probability 1 there are no three collinear points. Thus, the point visibility graph will always be a clique.
Narrowing the Gap between NP and ∃
Sections 4 and 5 and the corollaries there give a logarithmic upper bound on the expected bitprecision for the input and the output of ∃ -complete algorithmic problems (except for computing the minimum-link path). These problems have worst case inputs where their solutions are geometric objects whose description requires at least exponential bit-precision. The exponential bit-precision phenomenon is the bottleneck for NP-membership of all these ∃ -complete problems. Our analysis shows that, in the context of the problems mentioned in Corollary 7 and 9, the gap between ∃ and NP (if it exists) is formed by near-degenerate input. Naturally, our analysis applies to the real verification algorithm of ∃ -complete problems. We show in the next section that the existence of a real verification algorithm is equivalent to ∃ -membership.
Figure .
Given two simple closed curves in the plane it is straightforward to design an algorithm, which checks if the two curves are equivalent. But it is not straightforward to describe an ETR formula for it.
Algorithmic membership in ∃
The complexity class ∃ is often called a "real analogue" of NP, because it deals with realvalued variables instead of Boolean variables. This analogy is correct, when we compare SAT with ETR. However, the most common way to think about NP is in terms of certificates and verification algorithms. The seminal theorem of Cook and Levin shows the equivalence of the two perspectives on NP [30, 74] . We show a similar equivalence between ETR-formulas and real verification algorithms. Intuitively, a real verification algorithm is a nondeterministic algorithm that runs on the real RAM that accepts as input both an integer instance I and a certificate, which may contain both integer and real components, and verifies that the certificate describes a valid solution to the instance in polynomial time. See Appendix G for a precise definition.
Theorem . For any discrete decision problem Q, there is a real verification algorithm for Q if and only if Q ∈ ∃ .
Our proof closely follows classical simulation arguments reducing nondeterministic polynomial-time (integer) random access machines to polynomial-size circuits or Boolean formulas, either directly [95] or via nondeterministic polynomial-time Turing machines [28] [29] [30] 40] .
∃ is known to be equivalent to the discrete portion of the Blum-Shub-Smale complexity class N P 0 -real sequences that can be accepted in polynomial time by a non-deterministic BSS machine without constants, and the equivalence of BSS machines without constants and ETR formulas is already well-known [16, 17] . However, the BSS-machine does not directly support the integer computations necessary for common standard programming paradigms such as indirect memory access and multidimensional arrays. The real RAM model originally proposed by Shamos [92, 106] does support indirect memory access through integer addresses; however, Shamos did not offer a precise definition of his model, and we are not aware of any published definition precise enough to support a simulation result like Theorem 10. We rectify this gap in Appendix A.1 by offering a precise definition of the real RAM that generalizes both the word RAM and BSS models, and which we believe formalizes the intuitive model implicitly assumed by computational geometers. Our real verification algorithms are then defined in terms of this precise model.
Theorem 10 not only strengthens the intuitive analogy between NP and ∃ , but also enables much simpler proofs of ∃ -membership in terms of standard geometric algorithms. Our motivation for developing Theorem 10 was Erickson's optimal curve straightening problem [42]: Given a closed curve γ in the plane and an integer k, is any k-vertex polygon topologically equivalent to γ? (See Figure 9 .) The ∃ -hardness of this problem follows from an easy reduction from stretchability of pseudolines, but reducing it directly to ETR proved much more complex; in light of Theorem 10, membership in ∃ follows almost immediately from the standard Bentley-Ottman sweep-line algorithm [12] . To further illustrate the power of our technique, we also consider a new topological problem in Appendix G, which we call optimal unknotted extension: Given a simple polygonal path P in 3 and an integer k, can we extend P to an unknotted closed polygon with at most k additional vertices? In light of Theorem 10, the proof that this problem is in ∃ is straightforward: To verify a positive instance, guess the k new vertices and verify that the resulting knot is trivial using existing NP algorithms [58, 73] .
Corollary . The following discrete decision problems are in ∃ . The art gallery problem [2] . The optimal curve straightening problem [42] . The optimal unknotted extension problem.
Conclusion
We presented an analysis of the minimal bit-precision required by polynomial time, real RAM algorithms under parametrized perturbations of their input. This parametrization can be considered a model for practical input data [110] . Our analysis generalizes prior theoretical results on robustness of algorithms under uniform random input [27, 35, 45] and provides a theoretical justification for the performance of exact computation CGAL implementations that use constant complexity geometric primitives [18, 34, 55, 56] . As our bounds are widely applicable they arguably also justify the usage of the real RAM itself as a model of computation. We used the analysis of the real RAM to show that the exponential bit-precision phenomenon for solutions of some ∃ -complete problems comes from near-degenerate input, thereby narrowing the gap between NP and ∃ . We wish to conclude with three open questions:
. Are there published real RAM algorithms that even for perturbed input require exponential bit-precision, and do these algorithms possibly abuse the power of the real RAM? . Do all ∃ -complete problems, under slight perturbation of their input, have a solution which can be described with expected polynomial bit-precision? Or are there indeed ∃ -complete problems that require high bit-precision even under a reasonable model of perturbation? . Can we develop practical algorithms with performance guarantees for ∃ -complete problems?
A Preliminaries

A. What is the Real RAM?
The real RAM has been the standard underlying model of computation in computational geometry since the field was founded in the late 1970s [92, 106] . Despite its ubiquity, we are unfortunately unaware of any published definition of the model that is simultaneously precise enough to support our results and broad enough to encompass most algorithms in the computational geometry literature. The obvious candidate for such a definition is the real-computation model proposed by Blum, Shub, and Smale [16, 17] ; however, this model does not support the integer operations necessary to implement even simple geometric algorithms. Even though the real RAM is often presented, either formally or intuitively, as a random access machine that stores and manipulates only exact real numbers, countless algorithms in this model require decisions based on both exact real and finite precision integer values. Consider the following example: Given an array of n real values as input, compute their sum. Any algorithm that computes this sum must store and manipulate real numbers; however, the most straightforward algorithm also requires indirect memory access through an integer array index. More complex examples include call stack maintenance, discrete symbol manipulation, multidimensional array indexing and slicing, and dynamic management of pointer-based data structures.
On the other hand, real and integer operations must be combined with care to avoid unreasonable discrete computation power. A model that supports both exact constant-time real arithmetic and constant-time conversion between real numbers and integers, for example using the floor function, would also trivially support arbitrary-precision constant-time integer arithmetic. (To multiply two integers, cast them both to reals, multiply them, and cast the result back to an integer.) Including such constant-time operations allows any problem in PSPACE to be solved in polynomial time [103] ; see also [13, 40, 57, 69] for similar results.
To accommodate this mixture of real and integer operations, and to avoid complexity pitfalls, we define the real RAM as an extension of the standard integer word RAM [54] . We define the real RAM in terms of a fixed parameter w, called the word size. A word is an integer between 0 and 2 w − 1, represented as a sequence of w bits. Mirroring standard definitions for the word RAM, memory consists of two random access arrays W [0 .. 2 w − 1] and R[0 .. 2 w − 1], whose elements we call registers. Both of these arrays are indexed/addressed by words; for any word i, register W [i] is a word and register R[i] is an exact real number. (We sometimes refer to a word as an
Class
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Arithmetic and boolean address when it is used as an index into one of the memory arrays.)
A program on the real RAM consists of a fixed, finite indexed sequence of read-only instructions. The machine maintains an integer program counter, which is initially equal to 1. At each time step, the machine executes the instruction indicated by the program counter. The goto instruction modifies the program counter directly; the halt and accept and reject instructions halt execution (and possibly return a boolean result); otherwise, the program counter increases by 1 after each instruction is executed.
The input to a real RAM program consists of a pair of vectors (a, b) ∈ n × m , for some integers n and m, which are suitably encoded into the corresponding memory arrays before the program begins. 1 To maintain uniformity, we require that neither the input sizes n and m nor the word size w is known to any program at "compile time". The output of a real RAM program consists of the contents of memory when the program executes the halt instruction.
Following Fredman and Willard [49, 50] and later users of the word RAM, we assume that w = Ω(log N ), where N = n + m is the total size of the problem instance at hand. This so-called transdichotomous assumption implies direct constant-time access to the input data. Table 1 summarizes the specific instructions our model supports. All word operations operate on words and produce words as output; all real operations operate on real numbers and produce real numbers as output. Each operation is parametrized by a small number of constant words i, j, and k. The running time of a real RAM program is the number of instructions executed before the program halts; each instruction requires one time step by definition.
Our model supports the following specific word operations; all arithmetic operations interpret words as non-negative integers between 0 and 2 w − 1.
(Other bitwise boolean operations can of course be implemented by composing bitwise nands.) Similarly, our model supports the following exact real operations.
To avoid unreasonable computational power, our model does not allow casting real variables to integers (for example, using the floor function · ), or testing whether a real register actually stores an integer value, or any other access to the binary representation of a real number. However, we do allow casting integer variables to reals.
A. Definition of Smoothed Analysis
In this paragraph, we will formally define the smoothed complexity of an algorithm. For this paragraph, we assume that we have some algorithm fixed. Let us fix some δ ∈ [0, 1], which describes the magnitude of perturbation. The variable δ describes by how much we allow to perturb the original input. In this paper, we consider an array I = (a, b) ∈ n × m of n real numbers and m integers as the input. We assume that each real number is perturbed independently and that the integers stay as they are. We denote by (Ω δ , µ δ ) the probability space where each x ∈ Ω δ defines for each instance I a new 'perturbed' instance I x = (a + x, b). We denote by (I x ) the cost of instance I x . The smoothed expected cost of instance I equals:
If we denote by Γ n the set of all instances of size n, then the smoothed complexity equals:
This formalizes the intuition mentioned before: not only do the majority of instances behave nicely, but actually in every neighborhood (bounded by the maximal perturbation δ) the majority of instances behave nicely. The smoothed complexity is measured in terms of n and δ. If the expected complexity is small in terms of 1/δ then we have a theoretical verification of the hypothesis that worst case examples are well-spread.
A. Notation
We use [a] to indicate the set {1, . . . , a}. Let z = (z 1 , . . . , z d ) ∈ d be a vector with integer coordinates. We denote by C z the unit (hyper)cube, which has z as its minimal corner or formally:
We generalize this notation of cubes to cylinders. Given z ∈ d and s ∈ , we define the unit cylinder C s z ⊂ d+s as C s z = {x ∈ d+s | z i ≤ x i < z i + 1, ∀i = 1, . . . , d} and subsequently also define
} as a grid of cylinders. We suppress the s in the notation, when it is clear from context. Note that for s = 0, cylinders and cubes are the same. We denote by C s (d, k) the collection of all d + s-dimensional unit cylinders:
Let C be a cube partitioned by unit cubes C (d, k) . Every facet of C intuitively is a grid of (d-1)-dimensional cubes C(d, k − 1). In the remainder of the paper, we want to argue about varieties that intersect cubes in C(d, k) and we do this via induction of the facets. Therefore, we formalize the above intuition:
Let C be a (d+s)-dimensional cylinder, partitioned by (d+s)-dimensional cylinders of equal width. We say C is equivalent to C(d, k) , denoted by C ∼ = C(d, k) , if there exists an affine transformation τ of C such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between cylinders in τ(C) and C(d, k) where corresponding cylinders coincide. We give to examples of this equivalence relation that is often used in the remainder of the paper: (1) Consider any d, k and any (d − 1)dimensional, orthogonal hyperplane H that intersects a d-dimensional cube C 0 (d, k) we have that
(2) Consider the d-dimensional grid Γ ω as defined in the introduction and a cube C which has one corner on the origin and width kω. The intersection C ∩ Γ ω is equivalent to C 0 (d, k).
Following [31], we define a d-variate polynomial p in x 1 , . . . , x d with coefficients in as a finite linear combination of monomials with coefficients in and we will denote this by Erickson, van der Hoog, Miltzow XX:
We denote by V (p) := {x ∈ d : p(x) = 0} the variety of p. For any subset S ⊂ R d , we say that p intersects S if S ∩ V (p) = . Given a set of polynomials p 1 , . . . , p k , we denote their variety as V (p 1 , . . . , p k ) = i=1,...,k V (p i ). Let f be an expression, which defines a function, then we also use the notation V ( f ) = {x : f (x) = 0}, although it is not a variety. We say f intersects a set S, if V ( f ) ∩ S = . We will also need the notion of the dimension of a variety. We assume that most readers have some intuitive understanding, which is sufficient to follow the arguments. It is out of scope to define this formally in this paper, so we refer to the book by Basu 
B Smoothed Analysis of the real RAM
The first part of this section is devoted to prove Theorem 1, which states that a real RAM algorithm A with algebraic-degree ∆ and algebraic-dimension d runs correctly (under smoothed analysis with perturbation magnitude δ) when it uses a bit-precision logarithmic in n/δ. Specifically, we prove the following lemma which implies Theorem 1. In Section C we generalize this lemma so that the operations in A may include square roots.
Lemma . Consider the real RAM without square roots and a polynomial time algorithm A with algebraic-degree ∆ and constant algebraic-dimension. Then under perturbations of the input of magnitude δ, A can be robustly executed if the input has an expected bit-precision of:
Proof strategy and notation. We consider A with input I = (a, b) where a is real-valued input in [0, 1] n . We assume that the word RAM has a word size w which allows us to express 2 w = 1 ω different values for each coordinate. Since A runs in polynomial time it can make at most a polynomial number of binary decisions. As we explained in the Preliminaries Section A at every such binary decision, the algorithm looks at either a real-valued register or at an integer-value register and verifies if the value at the register is 0 or strictly greater than 0. For every real-valued register R i , per assumption the value at that register is the result of two d-variate polynomials p i and q i with maximum degree ∆. Let z = (a i 1 , . . . , a i d ) be the input registers that R i depends on. Then per assumption R i = p i (z)/q i (z) and the evaluation of R i depends on the evaluation of the polynomials p i and q i . During smoothed analysis we permute our input a into new input (a + x) and we compare the execution of A with the input (a + x) to its execution with the input a which is the representation of (a + x) with limited bit-precision. We are interested in the probability that the execution of A under both inputs is the same, ergo the chance that for all comparison operations, the algorithms give the same answer. First we show that with high probability a single d-variate polynomial p evaluates to the same sign under (a + x) and a . Second we apply the union bound to bound the probability that the algorithm A gives the same output under (a + x) and a for all registers. Lastly we upper bound the expected bit-precision. For the smoothed analysis, we snap our permuted real-valued input (a + x) onto a point with limited precision (a point in ω d ∩[0, 1] d ). For any real value in [0, 1] d , the natural choice to snap to is the closest point in ω d ∩ [0, 1] d . Ergo, for all y ∈ ω d , all points in the Voronoi cell of y are snapped to y. Note that in this case, the Voronoi cells of all these cells are just d-dimensional cubes and we shall denote them by C( y). The set of Voronoi cells over all y ∈ ω d ∩ [0, 1] d forms a d-dimensional cube with the following property:
XX:
Robust Realistic Geometric Computations
We permute the original input a with a random value x ∈ Ω = [− δ 2 , δ 2 ] d to obtain a new realvalued point (a + x) that must lie within a cube in Γ ω . However the choice of a and δ limits the cubes in Γ ω where (a + x) can lie in. Specifically the range of possible locations for (a + x) is a d-dimensional cube of width δ centered around a. This cube contains a d-dimensional cube of cells which is equivalent to C(d, δ/ω ) which we shall denote by Γ ω (a) and possibly intersects an additional perimeter of cells (refer to Figure 10 ). We can use this observation together with Theorem 20 to estimate the probability that sign(p(x + a)) = sign(p(a )):
The variety V (p) separates the region where p evaluates positively (green) and where it evaluates negatively (orange). We see two scenarios where the input I is shown as a single real-valued twodimensional point. The permuted input I x must lie within a cube of width δ centered around I. Depending on its size and placement, it contains a subgrid of a certain diameter.
Lemma (Register-Snapping). Let R be some register, whose value can be described by two d-variate polynomials p, q maximum degree ∆. Let a ∈ d be fixed and x ∈ Ω = [−δ/2, δ/2] d chosen uniformly at random. Assume (a + x) is snapped to a point a ∈ ω d ∩ [0, 1] d . Then sign(R(a + x)) = sign(R(a )) with probability at most:
Proof. Note that if both polynomials have the same sign after snapping, also R will have the same sign. Thus we are free to show that sign(p(a + x)) = sign(p(a )) with probability at most:
The statement for q is equivalent and the union bound on these separate probabilities then upper bounds probability that the register R does not have the same sign. Whenever we have a continuous polynomial p and points x, z ∈ d with p(x) < 0 and p(z) > 0 then there must be a point y ∈ line(x, z) for which p( y) = 0. It follows that if a cube C ∈ Γ ω is not intersected by p, all points in C either have a positive or negative evaluation under p. If the point (a + x) lies in a Voronoi cell C(a ) ∈ Γ ω , then per construction it will be snapped to its center point a and if C(a ) is not intersected by p then si g n(p(a + x)) = si gn(p(a )). Therefore we are interested in the probability that (a + x) is contained in a cell that is intersected by p. As we discussed, the set of possible locations of (a + x) is a cube which contains Γ ω (a) ∼ = C(d, δ/ω ) together with a perimeter of cells. We upper bound the probability that (a + x) lies within a cell that is intersected by p probability in two steps: (1) We upper bound the number of cells on the perimeter and assume that they are all intersected by p.
(2) we upper bound the number of cells of Γ ω (a) that are intersected by p. These two numbers, divided by the total number of cells in Γ ω (a) gives the upper bound we are looking for. Note that the width of Γ ω (a) is equal to k = δ ω and that the perimeter of Γ ω (a) contains 2d · k d−1 cells. Theorem 20 gives an upper bound on the number of intersected cubes in C(d, k) of:
Erickson, van der Hoog, Miltzow
XX:
There are δ/ω d cubes in Γ ω (a) and it follows that:
Using this, in conjunction with the union bound finishes the proof.
Lemma 13 upper bounds the probability that for input (a + x) and a a single real-valued comparison in A is different. We can use the union bound to upper bound the probability that for the whole algorithm, any real-valued comparison for (a + x) and a is different.
Lemma (Snapping). Let I = (a, b) be the input of an algorithm A that makes T (n) comparison operations and a ∈ n and b ∈ n . Let x be a permutation chosen uniformly at random in [−δ/2, δ/2] and let I x = (a + x, b) be a permuted instance of the input. For all ∈ [0, 1], if I x is snapped to a grid of width ω ≤ δ
Then I x and I are equivalent input for the algorithm A with probability at least 1 − .
Proof. By E i for i ∈ [T (n)], we denote the event that in the i'th algorithm step the inputs I x and I get a different outcome. Lemma 13 upper bounds the probability of E i occuring by:
The probability that I x and I are not equivalent is equal to the probability that for at least one event E i , the event occurs. In other words:
In the antecedent, P r(I x and I not equivalent) < is implied by T (n) · 4ω∆3 d (d+1) δ < and this proves the lemma.
Fianlly we use Lemma 14 to get an estimate of the expected bit-precision of the algorithm. For this estimation we need the following folklore lemma about swapping the order of integration [111] .
Lemma .
Given a function f : Ω → {1, . . . , b} and assume that Pr( f (x) > b) = 0. Then it holds that
Using Lemma 15, the expected value of bit(I x ) can be expressed as:
We split the sum at a splitting point l:
Pr(bit(I x ) ≥ k).
XX:
Robust Realistic Geometric Computations
Now we note that any probability is at most 1 therefore the left sum is at most l. Through applying Lemma 14 we note that:
which in turn implies:
This finishes the proof of Theorem 1.
B. Implications
We can apply Theorem 1 to classical geometric problems to show Corollary 2 by giving an upper bound on the algebraic-dimension and algebraic-degree of these polynomial-time algorithms. For sorting real numbers a 1 , . . . , a n , the comparison operations are of the form a i − a j > 0. This has degree ∆ = 1 and dimension d = 2.
Computing the convex hull of a point set in fixed dimension k can be done using only the order type of the pointset. The order type in dimension k corresponds to computing the determinant of a matrix with matrix-dimension k, with k 2 − k real input entries. Therefore the algebraic-dimension d = k 2 − k and the ∆ ≤ k. As k is constant, so is d and ∆.
Computing a Delaunay-triangulation can be computed naively in the plane, by making an in-circle test for every triple of points, and check if a forth point is contained in the circle. The in-circle test has constant d and ∆. For dimension k, let us repeat some standard trick. We first lift the points to k+1 , then compute the convex hull C and project C back to the original space, to get the Delaunay-triangulation. Given a finite set of points P ⊂ k , we can map them to ϕ(P) = P ⊂ k+1 .
It is well known that the orthogonal projection of the convex hull of P onto k gives the Delaunay-triangulation. As ϕ and computing the convex hull has bounded algebraic-dimension and algebraic-degree, so has the Delaunay-triangulation. Let us now consider to check if a set of guards is correctly guarding a given gallery (polygon). Again, this can be done purely in terms of order types and order types have bounded algebraicdimension and algebraic-degree. Thus so has checking if the guards see the entire polygon.
C Square Roots
The aim of this section is to give a proof to Theorem 3. In Appendix B we worked under the assumption that at all times a real register R[i] contains a value that can be expressed as the quotient of two d-variate polynomials f i , g i of maximal degree ∆. In this section we make the real RAM model slightly more powerful as we allow f i and g i to also include the square root function and we even allow recursive applications of the square root function. Formally, every real register holds an expression f (x 1 , . . . , x d ), which contains multiplication, addition, subtraction, division and square roots. We say f is equivalent to the polynomials p, q 1 , . . . , q s ∈ [x 1 , . . . , x d , y 1 , . . . , y s ] if and only if:
See Lemma 16, on how to find those equivalent polynomials. We call p the evaluation polynomial and q 1 , . . . , q s the constraint polynomials. We define the algebraic-degree of f as the maximum algebraic-degree of p, q 1 , . . . , q s . We say the algebraic-dimension of f equals d, and s is denoted as the extra algebraic-dimension. We say an algorithm has algebraic-degree ∆, algebraic-dimension d and extra algebraic-dimension s, if and only if all real registers at time of comparison have those properties. We are now ready to state the main theorem of this section.
Theorem . Consider the real RAM with square roots and a polynomial time algorithm A with algebraic-degree ∆, algebraic-dimension d, and extra algebraic-dimension s. Then under perturbations of the input of magnitude δ, A can be correctly executed on a real RAM if the input has an expected required bit-precision of O
The theorem statement in its full generality allows for recursive applications of the square root function. For example, x 1 + x 2 + x 5 3 , would be a valid expression for a real register. However we wish to note that in less general form it applies to the classical sum of square roots problem, as explained in Section C.1
Before we elaborate on the proof of Theorem 3, we first show how to transform an expression f into an equivalent set of polynomials. Then we go through the snapping and the integrating part in the same manner as with single polynomials.
Lemma . Let f be an expression on variables x 1 , . . . , x d , with at most s square roots and divisions. Then we can transform f , into equiavlent polynomials p, q 1 , . . . , q s ∈ [x 1 , . . . , x d , y 1 , . . . , y s ].
Proof. We transform f = f 0 step by step, into expressions f 1 , . . . , f s such that f s = p is a polynomial and we add in step i one additional polynomial q i . In step i, we distinguish between two cases, and always introduce the variable y i :
The first case is that f i−1 has the form f i−1 = g( h), where h is a polynomial and g is some other expression. Note that g and h may also depend on other variables. We define f i = g( y i ), with the new variable y i and add the constraint q i = y 2 i − h which is a polynomial expression. The second case is that f i−1 has the form f i−1 = e(g/h), where g, h are a polynomials and e is some other expression. Note that e, g and h may also depend on other variables. Then we define f i = e(g · y i ) and q i = y i · h − 1.
Let us consider similar, to the case of the real RAM without square roots, the case that a single register takes a different decision.
Lemma (Register-Snapping). Let R be a register, which holds some expression f with maximum degree ∆, algebraic-dimension d and extra algebraic-dimension s. Let a ∈ d be fixed and x ∈ Ω = [−δ/2, δ/2] d chosen uniformly at random. Assume (a + x) is snapped to a point a ∈ ω d ∩ [0, 1] d . Then sign( f (a + x)) = sign( f (a )) with probability at most:
For the forthcoming proof, we assume that the reader is familiar with the proof of Lemma 13.
Proof. As f is a continuous function, we can upper bound the probability of f (a ) = f (a), by counting the number of Voronoi cells c ∈ Γ ω , which are intersected by V ( f ). Unfortunately, f is not a polynomial and we cannot employ Theorem 20. Instead, we consider the polynomials p, q 1 , . . . , q s ∈ [x 1 , . . . , x d , y 1 , . . . , y s ], which exist by assumption of the lemma. We denote by π : d+s → d , (x 1 , . . . , x d , y 1 , . . . , y s ) → (x 1 , . . . , x d ) the orthogonal projection on the first d coordinates. From the definition of (p, q 1 , . . . , q s ) it follows that the orthogonal projection of their variety is equal to V ( f ), or in other words: V ( f ) = π(V (p, q 1 , . . . , q s )). We want to upper bound the number of d-dimensional Voronoi cells that are intersected by V ( f ), and we obtain this by providing an upper bound on the number of (d+s)-dimensional Voronoi cells that are intersected by the higher-dimensional variety V (p, q 1 , . . . , q s ). Given a cube c ∈ Γ ω ⊂ d , we define (just as in Appendix A) the cylinder c = {(x, y) ∈ d+s : x ∈ c}. Per construction of (p, q 1 , . . . , q s ), it holds that:
In analogy to Lemma 13, we consider the d-dimensional cube partitioned by Γ ω (a) ∼ = C 0 (d, δ ω ). The grid Γ ω (a) in our (d+s)-dimensional space becomes a collection of cylinders equivalent to C s (d, δ ω ). This now allows us to apply Theorem 23 and bound the number of cylinders that are intersected by V (p, q 1 , . . . , q s ) by:
Via our transformation, this implies that the number of cells in Γ ω (a) that are intersected by V ( f ) is upper bound by k d−1 (2∆) s+1 3 d (d + 1)!. Just as in Lemma 13, the perimeter of Γ ω (a) contains at most 2d k d−1 cells. There are k d cubes in Γ ω (a) and it follows that:
This finishes the proof.
Lemma 17 is identical to Lemma 13, except ∆ is replaced by (2∆) s+1 . Therefore the proof to Theorem 3 is henceforth identical to the proof of Theorem 1, except that ∆ is replaced by (2∆) s+1 . This finishes the proof of Theorem 3.
C. Implications
In this section, we show the two implications of Theorem 3.
In the of square roots algorithm, we have only one comparison, and the register holds the following expression
The following polynomials are equivalent: p = y 1 + . . . + y n − y n+1 + . . . + y 2n and q i = y 2 i − x i . Thus s = n, d = n, ∆ = 2. Thus, we see that Corollary 4 is implied by Theorem 3.
The fastest algorithm to compute the shortest path in a polygon with holes is by Hershberger and Suri [61] . However, it is not clear that the algorithm can be implemented using square roots alone. For our analysis, we consider the naive Dijkstra algorithm [36] on the visibility graph as follows. We define a graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of vertices of the polygon together with the start and end points s, t. We say two vertices in G are adjacent if they are visible within the polygon. Each edge receives a weight, which is equal to the Euclidean distance. Now the Dijkstra algorithm on G will give us the shortest path. It is based on the comparison of length of previously computed paths. That is on the correct evaluation of the following expression:
Here P 1 and P 2 denote some paths computed by the algorithm and E(P i ) being their edge set. We assume for notational convenience that a i , a i+1 hold the x and y-coordinate of the vertices of the polygon. Using Lemma 16, we can observe that the algebraic-dimension d = O(n), the algebraic-degree ∆ = 2 and the extra algebraic-dimension s = O(n). Now Theorem 3 implies Corollary 5.
D Polynomials Hitting Cubes
In the first part of this section, we upper bound the number of unit cubes that a d-variate polynomial p of bounded degree ∆ can intersect in C(d, k) . In Section D.1, we generalize Theorem 20, to deal with cylinders instead of cubes. Although the proofs are very similar, for pedagogical purposes, we keep them separate.
Theorem (Hitting Cubes). Let p = 0 be a d-variate polynomial with maximum degree ∆ and k ≥ 2∆ + 2. Then the polynomial p intersects at most k d−1 ∆3 d (d + 1)! unit cubes in C (d, k) .
Our proof gives a slightly stronger, but more complicated upper bound. The proof idea is to consider the intersection between a cube C z ∈ C(d, k) and the polynomial p. Then either a connected component of V (p) is contained in C z or V (p) must intersect one of the (d − 1)dimensional facets of C z . In order to estimate how often the first situation can occur, we use a famous theorem by Oleinik-Petrovski/Thom/Milnor, in a slightly weaker form. See Basu, Pollack and Roy [9, Chapter 7] for historic remarks and related results.
Theorem (Milnor [ ]) . Given a set of d-variate polynomials q 0 , . . . , q s with maximal degree ∆. Then the variety V (q 0 , . . . , q s ) has at most (2∆) d connected components.
We use Milnor's theorem later for more than one polynomial.
We also need the following folklore lemma. See the book from Cox, Little, O'Shea [32] , for more background on polynomials. Specifically Hilbert's Nullstellensatz, which can be found as Theorem 4.77 in the book by Basu, Pollack and Roy [9] is important.
Lemma (folklore). Let p ∈ [x 1 , . . . , x d ] be a d-variate polynomial and H = {x ∈ d : (x) = 0} a (d − 1)-dimensional hyperplane. Then V (p) ∩ H is the variety of a (d − 1)-variate polynomial or is a polynomial factor of p.
In our applications, will be of the form x i = a, for some constant a.
Proof of Theorem . Note first that if p has a linear factor , we decompose p into p = q · and apply the following for q and separately. This works as the maximum degree of q drops by one and the maximum degree of equals 1. Thus for the rest of the proof, we assume that p has no linear factors, which in particular, makes it possible to apply Lemma 22.
Let us define f (d) as the maximum number of unit cubes of C(d, k) that can be intersected by a d-variate polynomial p = 0 with maximal degree ∆. We will first show that
(1)
Then we will show in a similar manner for every d, k and ∆ holds that
Solving the recursion then gives the upper bound of the theorem as follows: first, we show by induction that Equation 1 and
establishes the induction basis. Using 2∆ ≤ k, the induction step goes as follows:
Now using k ≥ 2∆ + 2 ≥ 3, we can deduce that
This implies that f (d) ≤ k d−1 ∆3 d (d + 1)!. It remains to show the validity of Equation 1 and 2. If p is a univariate polynomial of degree ∆ then its variety V (p) is a set of at most ∆ points and therefore p can intersect at most ∆ disjoint unit intervals and this implies Equation 1.
To show the correctness of Equation 2, we refer to Figure 11 . Note that there are d(k + 1) axis-parallel (d − 1)-dimensional hyperplanes with integer coordinates that intersect C(d, k) . We denote them by H(d, k) . Formally, we define the hyperplane h(i, a) = { x ∈ d : x i = a }. This leads to the definition : H(d, k) 
By the comment at the beginning of the proof, we can assume that p has no linear factors and we apply Lemma 22 on p and each h ∈ H(d, k) . For all cubes in C(d, k) , all facets of such a cube are contained inside a (d − 1)-dimensional hyperplane h ∈ H(d, k) . By Milnor's theorem, there are at most (2∆) d cubes in C(d, k) which are intersected by p but whose boundary is not intersected by p. For any other cube in C(d, k) that is intersected by p, the polynomial must intersect a (d − 1)-dimensional facet of that cube.
Consider one of the d(k + 1) hyperplanes h ∈ H(d, k) . The set I = h ∩ C(d, k) is, up to affine coordinate transformations, equivalent to C (d −1, k) . Furthermore, by Lemma 22, V (p) restricted to h is the variety of a (d − 1)-dimensional polynom. Thus by definition, we know that p intersects at most f (d − 1) cubes in I. Each of these (d − 1)-dimensional cubes can coincide with a facet of at most two cubes in C (d, k) . It follows that f (d) is upper bound by (2∆) d + 2 · f (d − 1) · k(d + 1). This shows Equation 2 and finishes the proof.
D. Varieties hitting cylinders
In this section we generalize Theorem 20, to deal with more than one polynomial. For the application, we have in mind in Section B, we need to replace cubes by infinite cylinders.
Theorem . Let q 0 , . . . , q s ∈ [x 1 , . . . , x d , y 1 , . . . , y s ] be polynomials with maximum degree ∆ and k ≥ 2∆ + 1, such that the variety V (q 0 , . . . , q s ) is (d − 1)-dimensional. Then the variety V (q 0 , . . . , q s ) intersects at most k d−1 (2∆) s+1 3 d (d + 1)! unit cylinders in C s (d, k) .
The proof of Theorem 23 follows the same line of argument as Theorem 20, but with different constants.
Similarly to Lemma 22, for polynomials, we have to state a similar lemma, for varieties.
Lemma
(folklore). Let q 0 , . . . , q s ∈ [x 1 , . . . , x d , y 1 , . . . , y s ] be polynomials with maximum degree ∆. Furthermore, the variety V = V (q 0 , . . . , q s ) is
Then either is a factor of all q 0 , . . . , q s or V ∩ H is a (d − 2)-dimensional variety.
Proof of Theorem . Note first that if q 0 , . . . , q s have a linear factor , we decompose q 0 , . . . , q s into q i = q i · and apply the following for q 0 , . . . , q s and separately. This works as the maximum degree of q 0 , . . . , q s drops by one and the maximum degree of equals 1. Thus for the rest of the proof, we assume that q 0 , . . . , q s have no linear factors, which in particular, makes it possible to apply Lemma 24.
Let us define f (d) as the maximum number of unit cylinders of C s (d, k) that can be intersected by V (q 0 , . . . , q s ) with maximum degree ∆. We will first show that
Then we will show in a similar manner for every d, s and ∆ holds that
Solving the recursion then gives the upper bound of the theorem as follows: first, we show by induction that Equation 3 
We simplify this expression slightly, using k ≥ 2∆ + 2 ≥ 3. We deduce that
This implies that f (d) ≤ k d−1 (2∆) s+1 3 d (d + 1)!. It remains to show the validity of Equation 3 and 4. If V = V (q 0 , . . . , q s ) ⊂ 1+s is a 0-dimensional variety of degree ∆ then it is a set of at most t = (2∆) s+1 points, by Theorem 21. Therefore V can intersect at most t disjoint unit cylinders and this implies Equation 3. Now we show correctness of Equation 4. We denote V = V (q 0 , . . . , q s ) ⊂ d+s . Furthermore, we note that there are d(k + 1) axis-parallel (d − 1)-dimensional hyperplanes with integer coordinates that intersect C s (d, k) . We denote them by H(d, s, k) . Formally, we define the hyperplane h(i, a) = { x ∈ d+s : x i = a }. This leads to the definition:
(This is almost identical to the case with cubes.) For all cylinders in C s (d, k) , all facets of such a cylinder are contained inside a (d − 1)-dimensional hyperplane h ∈ H (d, s, k) . By Milnor's theorem, there are at most (2∆) s+k cylinders in C s (d, k) which are intersected by V but whose boundary is not intersected by V . For any other cylinder in C s (d, k) that is intersected by V , the variety must intersect a (d − 1)-dimensional facet of that cylinder.
Consider one of the d(k + 1) hyperplanes h ∈ H(d, k) . The set I = h ∩ C s (d, k) is, up to coordinate transformations, equivalent to C (d − 1, k) . Thus by definition, we know that V intersects at most f (d − 1) cylinders in I. (In particular, h ⊆ V , by the comment at the beginning of the proof.) Each of these of these (d − 1)-dimensional cylinders can coincide with a facet of at most two cylinders in C(d, k) . It follows that f (d) is upper bound by (2∆) s+d +2· f (d −1)·k(d +1). This shows Equation 4 and finishes the proof.
E Smoothed Analysis of Recognition Problems
Recently Hoog, Miltzow and Schaik [63] applied the concept of smoothed analysis to the recognition problem of order types. We generalize their approach to general recognition problems. This section is devoted to Theorem 8.
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Theorem . Let A be an extraction algorithm with a recognition problem R A and denote by n 1 and n 2 the size of the input for A and R A respectively. Suppose that under perturbations of the input of A, the algorithm A can be robustly executed if the input has an expected maximal bit-precision of O (log(n 1 /δ) ). Then the recognition problem R A , under slight perturbation of the witness, can be robustly verified with an expected bit-precision of O(log(n 2 /δ)).
We first formalize all notions in the theorem and then give a proof. We say A is an extraction algorithm, if it takes some geometric input g ∈ [0, 1] n and outputs some combinatorial object A(g) = c ∈ m . We assume that m is polynomial in n and only dependent on n. The recognition problem R A takes a combinatorial object c as input, and asks if there exists some geometric object g such that A(g) = c.
Given a recognition problem R A and some input c, the guessing algorithm non-deterministically guesses a geometric object g such that A(g) = c, if it exists. Otherwise, it outputs N I L. The bit-precision bit(c, R A ) of the guessing algorithm is the number of bits to describe each g i in g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ). To be precise bit(g i ) equals the number of bits to represent g i in binary and bit(g) = max i bit(g i ). Now, the bit-precision of the guessing algorithm is defined by bit(c; R A ) = min g: A(g)=c bit(g).
We are now ready to explain, smoothed analysis, specifically for recognition problems. The conceptual difficulty with smoothed analysis of recognition problems is that the model of perturbation is defined in terms of the output and not in terms of the input. The formal description is straightforward, but it is unusual to think about smoothed analysis in this way. The probability distribution of the output gives indirectly a probability distribution on the input as well, but there may be no simple way to describe this input distribution explicitly. Let us fix some extraction algorithm A, and consider some model of perturbation. We fix the magnitude of perturbation δ and denote the perturbation space by Ω δ . We have defined a simple model of perturbation, but we want to point out that other models of perturbations are valid just as well. We define the smoothed bit-precision of the guessing algorithm on input c as bit smooth (c, R A , δ) = max g: A(g)=c bit smooth (g, A, δ) .
Let us unwrap the last equation. We have given some input c to the combinatorial problem and there may be several g with A(g) = c. Let us fix the worst one possible. When we look at the smoothed bit-precision of g, we are really perturbing g according to Ω δ and then looking at the bit-precision with respect to this perturbation. If we denote by Γ n the set of all combinatorial objects of size n, then the smoothed bit-precision equals: bit smooth (n, δ) = max c∈Γ n bit smooth (c, R A , δ).
We are now ready for the proof.
Proof. This can be shown simply by using the definition.
Note that if A(g) has size n, that this implies that g has size m = Θ(n c ) for some fixed constant c > 0. Thus we get bit smooth (n, δ) = max g∈Γ m bit smooth (g, A, δ) XX:
Robust Realistic Geometric Computations
Now we need to observe that the last line is actually the definition of the bit-precision of A. Thus we get bit smooth (n, δ) = bit smooth (m, A, δ)
F
Smoothed Analysis of resource augmentation.
For the art gallery problem, Dobbins, Holmsen and Miltzow [38] showed that expanding the polygon by so-called edge-inflations, guarding will become easier. This leads to small expected bit-precision under smoothed analysis. Their proof consists of a problem specific part and a calculation of probabilities and expectations. We generalize their idea to a widely applicable framework for smoothed analysis of resource augmentation so that it remains to verify three simple problem specific properties. This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 6 and Corollary 7. We start with an example of geometric packing before we give a formal definition of a resource augmentation problem.
Convex geometric packing. In convex geometric packing the input is a set of convex objects that need to be placed in a unit square such that the objects do not overlap. This algorithmic problem is perceived as very difficult as it is not even known how to optimally pack a set of eleven unit squares into a minimum square-sized container [52] . Recent research shows that this problem is ∃ -complete [3] . A solution to the packing problem must specify both a translation and a rotation of each of the input objects and the optimal rotation or translation can be a real number with unbounded precision. Geometric packing has a natural resource augmentation where you slightly enlarge the container. Our results imply that under smoothed analysis of this enlargement, the optimal solution can be expressed with an expected logarithmic bit-precision.
Definition. Let us fix some algorithmic optimization problem P. For it to be a resourceaugmentation problem, we assume several specific conditions explained below. First, each input consists of the actual input I and an augmentation-parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. Secondly, we assume that there is an implicitly defined solution space χ I [α] = χ [α] . We suppress the input I in the notation, when it is clear from context. Also we denote χ = χ [0] . Furthermore, we assume that there is an evaluation function f : χ[α] → . The aim is to find a solution x * ∈ χ [α] for which f (x * ) is the maximum or minimum denoted by opt (χ[α] ). For notational convenience, we assume for the remainder of this section that P is a maximization problem. The other case is analogue. We say that α is a breakpoint if opt(χ[α − ]) = opt(χ I [α + ]), ∀ > 0. We assume three natural properties for resource augmentation problems. The monotonous property, which states that for all inputs I, for all α, α
. Note that the mono property implies that in a more augmented version of the problem, the optimum is at least as good.
The moderate property requires that the number of breakpoints N for χ I is upper bound by n O(1) .
The smoothable property requires that for all x optimal in χ I [α] and for all > 0, there is an x ∈ χ I [α + ] with bit-precision ≤ b = c log n/ , for some c ∈ , and f (x) ≤ f (x ). In other words, given some solution x we can increase the augmentation parameter by , to attain an XX:
(left) the input for the geometric packing problem. Three convex objects and the diameter of the packing box. The non-augmented normal solution space χ I [0] contains infinitely many solutions, as the objects can be rotated into many positions. The optimal packing might make use of a rotation which cannot be expressed using finite precision. If we augment the input, we need to pack the elements in a larger container and this allows for more solutions. We apply smoothed analysis to resource-augmentation problems with these three properties by choosing uniformly at random the augmentation α ∈ [0, δ]. We denote by bit(χ[α]) the minimal bit-precision needed to express an optimal solution in the solution space χ [α] . We upper bound the worst case expected value [bit [α] ] for α uniform at random between [0, δ].
Proof. Let the input I be fixed and let α be the augmentation parameter chosen uniformly at random within the perturbation range [0, δ].
Consider any value > 0. The variable α is chosen uniformly at random in the interval (0, δ], and P is moderate which implies that the probability that the interval [α − , α] contains a breakpoint is upper bound by N /δ. Assume that the interval [α − , α] does not contain a breakpoint then by definition opt(χ[α− ]) = opt(χ[α]). Let x be an optimal solution in χ[α− ].
As the problem P is smoothable and
with a bit-precision of at most c log(n/ ) and x is also optimal for χ [α] . It follows that for a random α ∈ (0, δ], the probability that there is no optimal solution in χ[α] with a bit-precision of c log(n/ ) is upper bound by:
Note that Equation 5 holds for every . We use this probability to obtain an upper bound on the XX:
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expected bit-precision. Using Lemma 15, we note that for all positive integers l holds that:
Any probability is at least 1 which means that the left sum is upper bound by l. We upper bound Pr(bit(χ[α] ) ≥ k) by equating k = c log(n/ k ) ⇔ k = n/2 (k/c) and applying Equation 5:
We choose l = log(nN /δ) and note that:
This concludes the theorem.
Applying Theorem 6. Dobbins, Holmsen and Miltzow show that under smoothed analysis the ∃ -complete art gallery problem has a solution with logarithmic expected bit-precision [38] . They show this under various models of perturbation with one being edge-inflation. During edge-inflation, for each edge e of the polygon, they shift the edge e by α outwards in a direction orthogonal to e. Our theorem generalizes the smoothed analysis result from [38] .
Corollary ( [ ]) . For the art gallery problem, with an α-relaxation which is an α-edge-inflation, the expected bit-precision with smoothed analysis over α is O(log(n/δ)).
Proof. The monotonous property and the smoothable property are both shown in the short Lemmas 6 and 7 in [38] . The evaluation function f in the art gallery problem counts the number of guards of a solution. The number of guards is a natural number and any polygon can be guarded using at most n/3 guards [46] . This implies the moderate property. Together with the monotonous property this proves that the number of breakpoints is upper bound by n/3 and the corollary follows. (3, 4) (4, 5)
(2, 2) ε Figure . (Left) A set of 8 convex objects which are tightly packed in a square with diameter (1 + α). Their enumerations specify a choice for π x and π y . Note that this choice is not unique. (Right) The objects packed in a square of diameter (1 + α + ) where an object with enumeration (i, j) is translated by ( i 10 .
j 10 ).
We can also prove new results such as the following result about geometric packing:
Corollary . For geometric packing of convex objects in a unit-size container, with an α-relaxation over the container size, the expected bit-precision with smoothed analysis over α is O(log(n/δ)).
Proof. In order to prove the corollary, we only have to prove that geometric packing with αrelaxation over the container size is monotonous, moderate and smoothable. For an input I and unit container size the solution space χ I [α] is the set of all solutions which contain a set of geometric objects from I packed within a container of size (1 + α).
. The monotonous property. For all α, α ∈ [0, 1] if α ≤ α then χ I [α] contains subsets of I which can be packed in a container of size (1 + α) and therefore the elements can be packed in a container of size (1 + α ). . The evaluation function f counts the number of geometric objects which are correctly packed in the solution. Thus the function f can evaluate to at most n distinct values and therefore the number of breakpoints is upper bound by n. . Let x ∈ χ[α] be a packing of k elements of the input in a container of size (1 + α). Fix a value > 0 and consider x placed in a container of width (1 + α + ). Using the extra space and the fact that the objects are convex, we can translate the objects in x such that any two objects in x are at least n+2 apart from each other and the boundary by translating them in the two cardinal directions (refer to Figure 13 ). We assign a linear order π x on the n elements such that: (1) if an object dominates another in the x direction it is further in the ordering and (2) if you take an arbitrary horizontal line, the order of intersection with this line respects the order π x . We define π y symmetrically for vertical lines. Since the input objects are convex, such an ordering always exists. Let a convex object O in x ∈ χ I [α] be the i'th element in π x and the j'th element in π y (we start counting from 1). We translate O by i n+2 , j n+2 . Observe that (1) all objects are contained in a container of diameter (1 + α + ) since an element is translated by at most n n+2 in any cardinal direction and (2) all objects are separated by at least n+2 . (Formally, we say A, B are separated by d, if and only if dist(A, B) 
Since any two objects are separated by at least n+2 , we can freely translate every object by O( /n) and freely rotate every object by O( /n) degrees such that all objects are still mutually disjoint. This free rotation and translation immediately implies that there is a positioning of the objects of x where all objects are correctly packed in a container of size (1 + α + ) which can be represented with at most O(log(n/ )) bit-precision and this is our new solution
Lastly to demonstrate the wide applicability of Theorem 6 we investigate a classical problem within computational geometry which is not an ETR-hard problem: computing the minimum-link path. In this problem the input is a polygonal domain and two points contained in it and one needs to connect the points by a polygonal path with minimum number of edges. Recently, Kostitsyna, Löffler, Polishchuk and Staals [72] showed that even if the polygonal domain P is a simple polygon where the n vertices of the polygon each have coordinates with log n bits each, then still the minimal bit-precision needed to represent the minimum-link path is O(k log n) where k is the length of the path and they present a construction where k = Ω(n).
Just like the art gallery problem, the minimum link path problem has a simple polygon as input and we propose to relax the minimum link path problem in the same way as the art gallery problem was relaxed in [38]: by edge-inflation. Two points in the minimum link path may be connected if and only if they are mutually visible. Hence, with an analysis identical to 25 we can immediately state that:
Corollary . For computing the minimum link path, with an α-relaxation which is edge-inflation, the expected bit-precision with smoothed analysis over α is O(log(n/δ)).
G Algorithmic Membership in ∃
A discrete decision problem is any function Q from arbitrary integer vectors to the booleans {TRUE, FALSE} (or equivalently, any language over the alphabet {0, 1}). An integer vector I is called a yes-instance of Q if Q(I) = TRUE and a no-instance of Q if Q(I) = FALSE. Let • denote the concatenation operator.
A real verification algorithm for Q is a real RAM program A that satisfies the following conditions, for some constant c ≥ 1:
A halts after at most N c time steps, using word size c log 2 N , given any input of total length N . For every yes-instance I ∈ n , there is a real vector x and an integer vector z, each of length at most n c , such that A accepts input (x, I • z). For every no-instance I, for every real vector x and every integer vector z, A rejects input (x, I • z).
A certificate (or witness) for yes-instance I is any vector pair (x, z) such that A accepts (x, I • z). Intuitively, a real verification algorithm is a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm on the real RAM that allows nondeterminism both by guessing words (or other discrete choices) and by guessing exact real numbers.
The rest of this section is devoted to proving the following theorem:
Theorem . For any discrete decision problem Q, there is a real verification algorithm for Q if and only if Q ∈ ∃ .
As usual, we prove this theorem in two stages. First, we describe a trivial real-verification algorithm for ETR. Second, for any discrete decision problem Q with a real-verification algorithm, we describe a polynomial-time algorithm on the word RAM that transforms every yes-instance of Q into a true ETR formula and transforms every no-instance of Q into a false ETR formula. The first reduction implies that every problem in ∃ has a real-verification algorithm; the second implies that every real-verifiable discrete decision problem is in ∃ .
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Lemma . ETR has a real verification algorithm.
Proof. Let Φ = ∃x 1 , . . . , x n : φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) be an arbitrary formula in the existential theory of the reals. The underlying predicate φ is a string over an alphabet of size m + O(1) (the symbols 0, 1, +, ·, =, ≤, <, ∧, ∨, ¬, and the variables x 1 , . . . , x n ), so we can easily encode φ as an integer vector. Our real verification algorithm takes the (encoded) predicate φ and a real certificate vector x ∈ m as input, and evaluates the predicate φ(x) using (for example) a standard recursive-descent parser. This algorithm clearly runs in time polynomial in the length of Φ.
Lemma . Every discrete decision problem with a real verification algorithm is in ∃ .
Proof. Fix a real verification algorithm A for some discrete decision problem Q. We argue that for any integer vector I, we can compute in polynomial time on the word RAM a corresponding ETR formula Φ(I), such that Φ(I) is true if and only if I is a yes-instance of Q. Mirroring textbook proofs of the Cook-Levin theorem, the formula Φ encodes the complete execution history of A on input (x, I • z). The certificate vectors x and z appear as existentially quantified variables of Φ; the input integers I are hard-coded into the underlying proposition Φ.
Now fix an instance I ∈ n of Q. Let N = n + 2n c , let w = c log 2 N = 2c log 2 n + O(1), and let T = N c = O(n c 2 ). Thus, w is an upper bound on the word size and T is an upper bound on the running time of A given input (x, I • z), for any certifciates x and z of length at most n c . Our output formula Φ(I) includes the following register variables, which encode the complete state of the machine at every time step t from 0 to T :
For each address i, variable W (i, t) stores the value of word register W [i] at time t. For each address i, variable R(i, t) stores the value of real register R[i] at time t. Finally, variable pc(t) stores the value of the program counter at time t. Altogether Φ(I) has (2 · 2 w + 1)T = O(n 2c 2 ) register variables. These are not the only variables in Φ(I); we will introduce additional variables as needed as we describe the formula below.
Throughout the following presentation, all indexed conjunctions ( ), disjunctions ( ), and summations ( ) are notational shorthand; each term in these expressions appears explicitly in the actual formula Φ(I). For example, the indexed conjunction w b=1 2 b = 2 b−1 + 2 b−1 is shorthand for the following explicit sequence of conjunctions 2 1 = 2 0 + 2 0 ∧ 2 2 = 2 2 + 2 1 ∧ · · · ∧ 2 w = 2 w−1 + 2 w−1 .
Integrality. To constrain certain real variables to have integer values, we introduce new global variables 2 0 , 2 1 , 2 2 , . . . , 2 w and equality constraints
The following ETR expression forces the real variable X to be an integer between 0 and 2 w−1 :
IsWord(X ) := ∃x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x w−1 : X = w−1 b=0
We emphasize that each invocation of IsWord requires w new variables x b ; each x b stores the bth bit in the binary expansion of X . Our final formula Φ(I) includes the following conjunction,
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Altogether this subexpression involves w2 w new one-bit variables and has length O(w2 w ). Similarly, we can force variable X to take on a fixed integer value j by explicitly summing the appropriate powers of 2:
Input and Output. We hardcode the fixed instance I into the formula with the conjunction (Here I[i] denotes the ith coordinate of I.) We leave the remaining initial word register variables W (i, 0) and all initial real register variables R(i, 0) unconstrained to allow for arbitrary certificates.
Execution. Finally, we add constraints that simulate the actual execution of A. Let L denote the number of instructions ("lines") in program A; recall that L is a constant independent from I. For each time step t and each instruction index , we define a constraint Update(t, ) that forces the memory at time t to reflect an execution of line , given the contents of memory at time t − 1. Our formula Φ(I) then includes the conjunction
The various expressions Update(t, ) are nearly identical. In particular, Update(t, ) includes the constraints W (i, t) = W (i, t − 1) and R( j, t) = R( j, t − 1) for every word register W [i] and real register R[ j] that are not changed by instruction . Similarly, unless instruction is a control flow instruction, Update(t, ) includes the constraint
Step(t) := ( pc(t) = pc(t − 1) + 1) .
Tables 2, 3, and 4 lists the important constraints in Update(t, ) for three different classes of instructions.
Encoding constant assignment, direct memory access, real arithmetic (including square roots), and control flow instructions is straightforward; see Table 2 . For an accept instruction, we set all future program counters to 0, which effectively halts the simulation. Similarly, we encode the reject instruction as the trivially false expression (0 = 1). Because there is no indirection mechanism in ETR itself, we are forced to encode indirect memory instructions using a brute-force enumeration of all 2 w possible addresses. Table 3 . Finally, Table 4 shows our encodings of arithmetic and bitwise boolean operations on words. For addition and subtraction, we store the result of the integer operation in a new variable z, and then store z mod 2 w using a single conditional. For upper and lower multiplication, we
Encoding constant assignment, direct memory access, real arithmetic, and control-flow instructions as formulae; "if A then B else C" is shorthand for (A ∧ B) ∨ (¬A ∧ C) define two new word variables u and l, declare that u · 2 w + l is the actual product, and then store either u or l. Similarly, to encode the division operations, we define two new word variables that store the quotient and the remainder. Finally, we encode bitwise boolean operations as the conjunction of w constraints on the one-bit variables defined by IsWord. Now suppose I is a yes-instance of . If we set the initial register variables to reflect the input (x, I • z) for some certificate (x, z), then Execute forces the final program counter pc(T ) to 0, at the time step when A accepts (x, I • z)). It follows that Φ(I) is true.
Summary
On the other hand, if I is a no-instance of Q, then no matter how we instantiate the remaining initial register variables, the Execute subexpression will include the contradiction (0 = 1) at the time step when A rejects. It follows that Φ(I) is false.
Altogether, Φ(I) has O(2 w (T + w) + T Lw) existentially quantified variables and total length O(2 w T L) = O(n 2c 2 ), which is polynomial in n. Said differently, the length of Φ(I) is at most a constant times the square of the running time of A on input (x, I • z), where x and z are certificate vectors of maximum possible length. We can easily construct Φ(I) in polynomial time on the word RAM by brute force. We emphasize that constructing Φ(I) requires no manipulation of real numbers, only of symbols that represent existentially quantified real variables.
G. Examples
To illustrate the usefulness of Theorem 10, we give simple proofs that three example problems are in ∃ . For two of these problems, membership in ∃ was already known [2, 42]; however, our proofs are significantly shorter and follow from known standard algorithms. We introduce the third problem specifically to illustrate the mixture of real and discrete non-determinism permitted by our technique.
Proof. Recall that the input to the art gallery problem is a polygon P with rational coordinates and an integer k; the problem asks whether there is a set G of k guard points in the interior of P such that every point in P is visible from at least one point in G. To verify a yes-instance, it suffices to guess the locations of the guards (using 2k real registers), compute the visibility polygon of each guard in O(n log n) time [59], compute the union of these k visibility polygons in O(n 2 k 2 ) time, and finally verify that the union is equal to P. We can safely assume k < n, since otherwise the polygon is trivially guardable, so the verification algorithm runs in polynomial time.
The optimal curve-straightening problem was introduced by the first author [42] . The input consists of an integer k and a suitable abstract representation of a closed non-simple curve γ in the plane with n self-intersections; the problem asks whether there is a k-vertex polygon P that is isotopic to γ, meaning that the image graphs of P and γ as isomorphic as plane graphs. To verify a yes-instance of this problem, it suffices to guess the vertices of the k-gon P (using 2k real registers), compute the image graph of P in O((n + k) log n) time using a standard sweep-line algorithm [12] , and then verify by brute force that P and γ have identical crossing patterns. Again, we can safely assume that k = O(n), since otherwise the curve is trivially straightenable, so the verification algorithm runs in polynomial time.
